A nonparametric test of stochastic dominance in multivariate distributions by Ian Crawford



























Department of Economics 
University of Surrey 
Guildford 
Surrey GU2 7XH, UK 
Telephone +44 (0)1483 689380 




A NONPARAMETRIC TEST OF STOCHASTIC 















Institute for Fiscal Studies
Abstract
The literature on statistical test of stochastic dominance has thus far
been concerned with univariate distributions. This paper presents non-
parametric statistical tests for multivariate distributions. This allows a
nonparametric treatment of multiple welfare indicators. These test are
applied to a time series of cross-section datasets on household level to-
tal expenditure and non labour market time in the UK. This contrasts
the welfare inferences which might be drawn from looking at univariate
(marginal) distributions with those which consider the joint distribution.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
There are doubtless many economic and social attributes which combine to de-
termine an individual’s and a society’s overall welfare. However, most of both
the theoretical and applied literature on the measurement of economic and social
welfare has been concerned with unidimensional indicators of economic status
(often equivalised net or gross income). This paper makes straightforward exten-
sions to Anderson’s (1996) work on nonparametric statistical tests of stochastic
dominance to allow tests of diﬀerences in social welfare based directly upon
multivariate distributions of economic and other factors.
One approach to the problem of how to assess multi-dimensional distribu-
tions is to aggregate them into a single index. For example, a vector of household
demands and demographic characteristics is typically aggregated using market
prices as weights for the marketed goods and adjusted by an equivalence scale
to reﬂect demographic diﬀerences such that the household’s total budget mul-
tiplied by the relative equivalence scale serves as a measure of its welfare. This
is the standard way of performing real income comparisons1. Assuming that
the relative equivalence scale can be calculated, this approach still only works
if the relevant prices are observed, if they correctly indicate consumers’ rela-
tive valuations of the goods which enter their utility function, and if they do
not vary across households. Even assuming that prices are observed, one set of
problems arise for instance if households are rationed (e.g. with respect to their
consumption of public goods, or by involuntary unemployment). In this case,
the appropriate price is not the market price but the price plus a term reﬂecting
the dis-utility of the ration2. Another set of problems occur if the prices faced
by diﬀerent households vary (e.g. regionally or because of diﬀerences in pro-
ductivity3 or attitudes to risk). Finally, even when household utilities can be
1See Sen (1979a) or Deaton and Muellbauer (1980).
2Hicks (1940), Rothbath (1941), Neary and Roberts (1980)
3Ulph (1978).
2aggregated in the traditional way using market prices, it may still be desirable to
allow for non-utility information such as life-span, health etc.4.I ne a c ho ft h e s e
cases a multi-dimensional approach may be more appropriate than aggregation.
The notion of stochastic dominance in multivariate distributions has been
suggested in this context by Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982). Stochastic dom-
inance criteria are essentially conditions linking diﬀerences in the empirical joint
distributions of the arguments of social welfare, with the ranking of those distri-
butions in terms of social welfare. The beneﬁto ft h i sa p p r o a c hi st h a ti ta l l o w s
us to work directly with the distributions of covariates rather than requiring that
they ﬁrst be aggregated into some welfare function. The drawback is that the
requirements placed on the comparison distributions such that welfare ranking
can be made are typically strong but these can be weaken by placing restric-
tions on the class of utility functions considered. The literature proceeds by
progressively strengthening the assumptions on the welfare function, whilst re-
laxing the empirical requirements necessary to rank distributions. This exercise
terminates with the choice of a particular welfare function at which point the
comparison of distributions becomes trivial.
A useful statistical basis for stochastic dominance criteria has been provided
by Anderson (1996) who describes a simple nonparametric framework for com-
paring univariate distributions directly. This allows straightforward tests of sto-
chastic dominance to be formulated. This paper extends Anderson’s goodness-
of-ﬁt based method to the multivariate dominance criteria set out in Atkinson
and Bourguignon (1982). There are a number of other, somewhat more recent,
approaches to testing univariate stochastic dominance which might also be use-
fully extended to multivariate settings. One is the Davidson and Duclos’s (2000)
incomplete moments approach to the univariate case - it has been suggested (by
Barrett and Donald (2003)) that this approach has superior asymptotic proper-
ties to Anderson’s method. Other alternatives include the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
based approaches to univariate dominance test (Barrett and Donald (2003)) al-
4Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982).
3though extensions of this approach to multivariate situations would be much
more diﬃcult.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy sets out stochastic
dominance criteria for bivariate distributions — the application to higher di-
mensional problems is postponed until later because the notational burden of
dealing with several dimensions is considerable and the main ideas can be more
clearly and simply expressed in a two-dimensional setting5. The bivariate condi-
tions have been described for ﬁrst and second order dominance by Atkinson and
Bourguignon (1982) and this paper simply extends the criteria to third order
dominance (the highest order typically discussed in the inequality literature)
for the joint distribution. Section 3 descr i b e ss u i t a b l ee s t i m a t o r sa n dt e s t so f
dominance for all of the functions of interest of the underlying joint distribu-
tion. These are based on Anderson’s (1996) procedures which are themselves
straightforward nonparametric analogues of Pearson’s goodness of ﬁt tests. Sec-
tion 4 outlines and illustrates the extension of these ideas to higher dimensional
problems. Section 5 applies these tests to the joint distribution of expenditure
and non labour market time in the UK using household level data budget survey
data from 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995. This contrasts the welfare inferences
which might be drawn from looking solely at one or other of the univariate (mar-
ginal) distributions with those which consider the joint distribution. Section 6
draws some conclusions.
2 Multivariate Stochastic Dominance Criteria
Suppose that social outcomes can be represented by a joint cumulative distrib-





5The most appropriate way of writing down the higher dimensional problems is to use
tensor notation. The use of partitioned matrices is much more cumbersome on the page, but
is more immediately useful for anyone wishing to programme up these tests. As a result the
material showing how these tests can be extended to higher dimensions uses matrix notation.
4If we want to be able to rank distributions in terms of social welfare then we need






F : R2 → [0,1];
F nondecreasing and continuous;





where the range space of xi is assumed to be [0,a i]. It is assumed that the social
welfare functional is drawn from the general class ω where
ω =
½
W (F) | W (F)=
ZZ









: R2 → R is the contribution to social welfare from each
household. This restricts the social welfare functional to be sum-ranking but
is still quite general in that this is a ﬂexible speciﬁcation with much room
for disagreement over the ranking of diﬀerent social states. For example, if we
deﬁne ψ (x1,x 2) ≡ u(x1,x 2), where u represents the indiviual’s utility function,
then we have a utilitarian social welfare function. In this case the disutility
of inequality is generated by the concavity of the household utility functions.
However, this formulation also covers ψ (x1,x 2) ≡ ψ (u(x1,x 2)) where ψ is
an increasing transformation of u. If the transformation is concave then this
introduces concerns for inequality directly into the social welfare function. If a
speciﬁcc h o i c eo fψ can be arrived at, then all social states can be ranked and
the diﬀerences between them quantiﬁed. This may be very useful but the act
of choosing any particular cardinal representation of social welfare will rule out
other maybe equally plausible/reasonable functions which may give diﬀerent
rankings. Another approach is to look for conditions under which all ψ’s with
similar canonical properties will unanimously rank social states.
Stochastic dominance criteria have been suggested as a way of ranking distri-
butions. The ideas are parallel to those for ranking uncertain choices in decision
theory and have been extended up to second order dominance to comparisons of
multi-dimensional distributions by Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982). For ex-
ample, suppose we wish to rank the joint distributions of x1 and x2: FA (x1,x 2)
and FB (x1,x 2). This is ranking is based upon the diﬀerence between social wel-






ψ (x1,x 2)∆f (x1,x 2)dx2dx1 (4)
where ∆f (x1,x 2)=fA (x1,x 2)−fB (x1,x 2). Following the notation in Atkin-
son and Bourguignon (1982) let F1 (x1) and F2 (x2) denote the marginal dis-





0 F (s,t)dsdt,l e tHi (xi)=
R xi





First order dominance corresponds to dominance of monotonic social wel-
fare functions (i.e. those for which ψ1,ψ2 ≥ 0). This set is denoted by
Ψ = {ψ : ψi ≥ 0}. In the bivariate case there are two subsets according to
the assumed sign of the cross-partial: Ψ− =
©





ψ : ψi ≥ 0 and ψij ≥ 0
ª
.B o t hs u b s e t sr e q u i r e∆F1 (x1),∆F2 (x2) ≤ 0
(that is, ﬁrst order dominance in the marginal distributions).
∀ x1 and x2,FA
1 (x1) − FB
1 (x1) ≤ 0and FA
2 (x2) − FB
2 (x2) ≤ 0 (5)
Dominance for the class Ψ− additionally requires ∆F (x1,x 2) ≤ 0;
∀ x1 and x2,FA (x1,x 2) − FB (x1,x 2) ≤ 0 (6)
(Hadar and Russel (1974))6.
Dominance for the class Ψ+ additionally requires ∆K (x1,x 2) ≤ 0;
∀ x1 and x2,KA (x1,x 2) − KB (x1,x 2) ≤ 0 (7)
(Levy and Paroush (1974)).
Second order dominance corresponds to a preference for mean-preserving
inequality reducing changes in the distribution function. For extensions of the
classes Ψ− and Ψ+ denoted by Ψ−− and Ψ++ and deﬁned below, both require
6∆F1 (x1) ≤ 0 and ∆F2 (x2) ≤ 0 are both implied by ∆F (x1,x 2) ≤ 0.
6∆H1 (x1),∆H2 (x2) ≤ 0 (that is, second order dominance in the marginal dis-
tributions).
∀ x1 and x2,HA
1 (x1) − HB
1 (x1) ≤ 0and HA
2 (x2) − HB
2 (x2) ≤ 0 (8)
The conditions for Ψ−− are those for Ψ− plus ψ11,ψ22 ≤ 0 and ψ112,ψ122 ≥
0;ψ1122 ≤ 0. This additionally requires ∆H (x1,x 2) ≤ 0;
∀ x1 and x2,HA (x1,x 2) − HB (x1,x 2) ≤ 0 (9)
(Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982).
The conditions for Ψ++ are those for Ψ+ plus ψ11,ψ22 ≤ 0 and ψ112,ψ122 ≤
0;ψ1122 ≥ 0. This additionally requires ∆L(x1,x 2) ≤ 0;
∀ x1 and x2,L A (x1,x 2) − LB (x1,x 2) ≤ 0 (10)
(Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982).
Third order dominance corresponds to a preference for inequality reducing
changes in the lower end of the distribution function. The class of ψ functions
considered here are straightforward extensions of Ψ−− and Ψ++.T h e s e a r e
denoted by Ψ−−− and Ψ+++ and are deﬁned below.




0 H (s,t)dsdt,l e tJi (xi)=
R xi





0 L(s,t)dsdt. For Ψ−−− and Ψ+++ both require ∆J1 (x1),
∆J2 (x2) ≤ 0 (that is, third order dominance in the marginal distributions).
∀ x1 and x2,JA
1 (x1) − JB
1 (x1) ≤ 0and JA
2 (x2) − JB
2 (x2) ≤ 0 (11)
The conditions for Ψ−−− are those for Ψ−− plus ψ1112, ψ1122 ≥ 0 and ψ11122,
ψ11222 ≥ 0;ψ111222 ≤ 0. This additionally requires ∆J (x1,x 2) ≤ 0:
∀ x1 and x2,JA (x1,x 2) − JB (x1,x 2) ≤ 0; (12)
The conditions for Ψ+++ are those for Ψ++ plus ψ1112, ψ1122 ≥ 0 and ψ11122,
ψ11222 ≥ 0;ψ111222 ≥ 0. This additionally requires ∆M (x1,x 2) ≤ 0
7∀ x1 and x2,MA (x1,x 2) − MB (x1,x 2) ≤ 0 (13)
Given these conditions linking social welfare rankings to characteristics of
the underlying distributions, the general approach is to construct estimates of
∆Fi (.), ∆F (.), ∆K (.), ∆Hi (.), ∆H (.), ∆L(.), ∆Ji (.), ∆J (.) and ∆M (.),a n d
to check conditions (5) to (13) to see if stochastic dominance can be established
and of what order, and to check the class of social welfare functions for which
such dominance is established.
3 Estimation and Inference
Let the joint rangespace of x1 and x2 be partitioned into s and t mutually
exclusive and exhaustive categories respectively7.D e n o t e b y nij the number
of observations falling into the ijth category and denote the total number of













where these probabilities are deﬁned by the unknown distribution F (x1,x 2) (i.e.
pij = F (xi,x j) − F (xi,x j−1) − F (xi−1,x j)+F (xi−1,x j−1)).
Let b n be the (s × t) matrix of empirical cell counts. This empirical frequency








p11 p12 ... p 1t
















p11 (1 − p11) −p11p12 ... −p11pst










Now suppose we wish to compare two distributions. Let the sample sizes be
nA and nB. Let the matrices of empirical frequencies be b nA and b nB and the
7There are two ways to proceed: either choose partition points and allow the cell frequencies
to be determined by the unknown distribution, or choose the cell frequencies and allow the
intervals between the partition points to be determined.
8estimated cell probabilities be b pA =
¡
nA¢−1 b nA and b pB =
¡
nB¢−1 b nB. Denote
the diﬀerence between the estimated cell probabilities by
b v =
¡
b pA − b pB¢
. (17)
Under the null hypothesis of common distributions then
b v





If the objects of interest i.e. ∆Fi (.), ∆F (.), ∆K (.), ∆Hi (.), ∆H (.), ∆L(.),
∆Ji (.), ∆J (.) and ∆M (.) can be written as linear transformations of the (nor-
mally distributed) diﬀerences in cell probabilities, then nonparametric tests
(analogous to Pearson goodness of ﬁt tests but in which F (.) need not be speci-
ﬁed) of stochastic dominance can be derived in a straightforward manner. This
is shown in Anderson (1996) who then provides a framework for statistical tests
of dominance in univariate distributions up to third order. Ibbott (1998) de-
scribes a test for ﬁrst order dominance in bivariate distributions. The following
describes tests for ﬁrst, second and third order dominance in bivariate distri-
butions (the treatment of ﬁrst order dominance is diﬀe r e n tt ot h a ti nI b b o t t
(1998)).
Let Lr be a r dimension lower triangular matrix of ones, let ιr be a vector



















let Tr be an ((r +1 )× r) matrix consisting of an (1 × r) row vector of zeros
vertically concatenated above an Ir.Let δ1 be a (1 × s) row vector of interval
widths deﬁned on the partition of x1,a n dl e tδ2 be a (1 × t) row vector of
interval widths deﬁned on the partition of x2.
9The estimates of ∆F1 (x1) and ∆F2 (x2) at the partition points are given by
d ∆F1 = Lsb vιt




and ∆F (x1,x 2) can be estimated at the partition points by
d ∆F = Lsb vL0
t. (22)
Similarly ∆K (x1,x 2) can be estimated at the partition points by
d ∆K = −
∙
Is
. . . − Is












Using the trapezoidal/linear interpolation rule for approximating integrals8,a p -
proximations of ∆H1 (x1) and ∆H2 (x2) can be estimated at the partition points
by9
d ∆H1 = Ls (0.5δ1 ¯ Is)WsTsLsb vιt




t (0.5δ2 ¯ It)L0
t
(24)
and an approximation of ∆H (x1,x 2) can be estimated at the partition points
by
d ∆H = Ls (0.5δ1 ¯ Is)WsTsLsb vL0
tT0
tW0
t (0.5δ2 ¯ It)L0
t. (25)
Similarly an approximation of ∆L(x1,x 2) can be estimated at the partition
points using
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t (0.5δ2 ¯ It)L0
t.
(26)
Approximations of ∆J1 (x1) and ∆J2 (x2) can be estimated at the partition
points by
c ∆J1 = Ls (0.5δ1 ¯ Is)WsTsLs (0.5δ1 ¯ Is)WsTsLsb vιt




t (0.5δ2 ¯ It)L0
tT0
tW0
t (0.5δ2 ¯ It)L0
t
(27)
8The quality of the approximation depends on the shape of the unknown cumulative distri-
bution function and the location and number of nodes. However, locating partitions at equal
quantile points will improve the approximation by linearising the CDF.
9Note that ¯ denotes the Hadamard product (element-by-element multiplication) opera-
tion on two matrices of the same dimensions or (as appropriate) element-row multiplication
of a column vector and a matrix with the same number of rows.
10and an approximation of ∆J (x1,x 2) can be estimated at the partition points
by




t (0.5δ2 ¯ It)L0
tT0
tW0
t (0.5δ2 ¯ It)L0
t.
(28)
Similarly an approximation of ∆M (x1,x 2) can be estimated at the partition
points using
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t (0.5δ2 ¯ It)L0
tT0
tW0
t (0.5δ2 ¯ It)L0
t.
(29)
Since all of these estimators are bi-linear with the general form:
d ∆Y = Ab vB (30)
where b v
a ∼ N (0,mΩ), it is reasonably straightforward to construct estimates of
the variance-covariance matrix of d ∆Y using the fact that b v is mean-zero under






and can be written as10










Forming these estimates and dividing through element-by-element by their stan-
dard errors forms the basis of a test of the null (common distribution) and
alternative (dominance) hypotheses given in table (1). For example, using
the convention adopted in Anderson (1996) and in Bishop, Chakraborti and
Thistle (1989) the hypothesis test of H0 : ∆Fi (.),∆F (.)=0versus H1F :
∆Fi (.),∆F (.) ≤ 0 is essentially that
10Magnus and Neudecker (1988), ⊗ indicates the Kronecker product.
11∀ x1 and x2, FA (x1,x 2) − FB (x1,x 2) ≤ 0 (34)
and
∃ x1 and x2, FA (x1,x 2) − FB (x1,x 2) < 0 (35)
i.e. no element of the matrix d ∆F is signiﬁcantly greater than zero, and that at
least one element is signiﬁcantly less than zero11.
Note that the marginal distributions (d ∆F1, [ ∆F2, d ∆H1,d ∆H2, c ∆J1, c ∆J2), and
the test statistics based on them, correspond exactly to Anderson’s tests of ﬁrst,
second and third order dominance in the univariate (marginal) distributions.
The null and alternative hypotheses for dominance in the univariate distribu-
tions are given in table (2). The relevant classes of univariate functions (denoted
by Ψ)a r eΨ for all functions which increase monotonically (Ψ ={ψ : ψi ≥ 0})
with respect to their single argument, Ψ− which is the subset of Ψ with dimin-
ishing ﬁrst derivatives (Ψ−={ψ : ψi ≥ 0,ψii ≤ 0})a n dΨ−− which is the subset
of Ψ− with negative third derivatives (Ψ−−={ψ : ψi ≥ 0,ψii ≤ 0,ψiii ≤ 0}).
Whilst each element of these matrices can be tested using pointwise proce-
dures, the overall test for the whole matrix will, in each case, involve multi-
ple comparisons of diﬀerences in means. Under the null hypothesis (no dom-
inance/common distributions) this involves the use of the critical values from
the studentised maximum modulus (SMM) distribution (Stoline and Ury (1979))
with degrees of freedom equal to the number of cells. Note that these tests are
symmetric. For example if we ﬁnd that we cannot reject H0 in favour of H1F
then, while we cannot establish ﬁrst order dominance (for Ψ−)o fFA over FB,
a tt h es a m et i m ew ek n o wt h a tw ew i l la b l et or e j e c tt h en u l li nf a v o u ro fﬁrst
order dominance of FB over FA for the same general class of functions.
11In principle there is a further alternative hypothesis, one of indeterminacy. For example
in the case of ﬁrst order dominance
H1F : ∆Fi (.),∆F (.) £ ∧ ¤ 0 ⇒ indeterminate
For H1F not to be rejected requires that there exist both signiﬁcantly positive and signiﬁcantly
negative elements of d ∆F (Anderson (1996)).
124 Extensions to higher dimensions
The preceeding section discussed how estimators for the objects of interest could
be formed and also how, using the fact that these estimators were bilinear, it
was straightforward to derive estimators for their variance-covariance structures.
These ideas also apply to higher dimensional problems. The extension of these
estimators and tests to higher dimensions is ﬁddly rather than intrinsically dif-
ﬁcult. Indeed it is slightly easier than it may ﬁrst appear because the order
of partial diﬀerentiation is reversible and once a variable is integrated out (by
parts) it stays out. For a D dimensional case uh = u(x1,x 2,...,xD) the ﬁrst








































In general there are 2D − 1 terms (D ﬁrst order partials which are assumed
positive — monotonicity — and 2D −D−1 cross partials to which the signs have
to be assigned) which increases rapidly with the number of dimensions. Taking
the example of D =4we have 4 positive ﬁrst order partial derivatives and 11
higher order partials in the expression for the diﬀerence in social welfare. Let x
denote the vector of indicators [w,x,y,z]
0 then denote the probability of falling
into the ijkl’th cell by
pijkl = Prob
©
x ∈ (wi−1,wi] ∩ (xj−1,x j] ∩ (yk−1,yk] ∩ (zl−1,zl]
ª
(37)





Pyz|w≤w1;x≤x1 Pyz|w≤w1;x1<x≤x2 ··· Pyz|w≤w1;xJ<x









and so the diﬀerence between two distributions is given by
b V = b PA − b PB (39)
The estimators for the diﬀerence in ﬁrst order partials are
d ∆Fw =( Lw ⊗ ιy) b V(ιz ⊗ ιx)
0 d ∆Fx =( ιy ⊗ ιw) b V(Lx ⊗ ιz)
0
d ∆Fy =( ιw ⊗ Ly) b V(ιx ⊗ ιz)
0 d ∆Fz =( ιy ⊗ ιw) b V(ιx ⊗ Lz)
0 (40)
The second order partials are
d ∆Fwx =( Lw ⊗ ιy) b V(Lz ⊗ Lx)
0 d ∆Fwy =( Lw ⊗ Ly) b V(ιz ⊗ ιx)
0
d ∆Fwz =( Lw ⊗ ιy) b V(Lz ⊗ ιx)
0 d ∆Fxy =( Ly ⊗ ιw) b V(Lx ⊗ ιz)
0
d ∆Fxz =( ιy ⊗ ιw) b V(Lx ⊗ Lz)
0 d ∆Fyz =( ιw ⊗ Ly) b V(ιx ⊗ Lz)
0
(41)
The third order partials are
d ∆Fwxy =( Lw ⊗ Ly) b V(ιx ⊗ Lz)
0 d ∆Fwxz =( Lw ⊗ ιy) b V(Lx ⊗ Lz)
0
d ∆Fxyz =( ιw ⊗ Ly) b V(Lx ⊗ Lz)
0 d ∆Fwyz =( Lw ⊗ Ly) b V(Lx ⊗ ιz)
0 (42)
The joint distribution is
d ∆F =( Lw ⊗ Ly) b V(Lx ⊗ Lz)
0 (43)
Alternative classes of aggregator function (with alternative signs for cross-partials)
can be developed using an identical approach to that in the bivariate case
(see Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987)). Estimation of the required variance-
covariance matrix and inference proceeds in an analogous manner to the bivari-











0 ⊗ (Lw ⊗ Ly)
0¢
(44)
Whilst this is extension to many dimensions may be feasible in principal it runs
into two major practical problems. The ﬁrst is interpretability. In the 4D case
there are 11 higher order partials whose signs (and the combination of these
14signs) has to be investigated. Intuition would tend to desert most researchers
and theorists. Note, however, that whenever we write down a social welfare
function all of these cross partials are immediately given signs (often zero) al-
though not as a matter of conscious thought. The second problem is to do with
data requirements. In order to nonparametrically estimate a multidimensional
distribution or density requires a great deal of data in order to maintain preci-
sion. Consider the example of n = 1000 observations distributed uniformly over
a5 d cube [0,1]
5. The expected number of observations in the neighbourhood
of a 0.25 cube is n
¡
0.25¢
=0 .32 i.e. less than 1 observation. To get 50 points
upon which to base an estimate of a cell frequency you need to average over a
0.555 cube. Hence it is necessary to take very large neighbourhoods, or to have
very large numbers of observations as the number of dimensions rises.
5 Empirical Application
This section applies the ideas outlined above to the analysis of dominance in
the joint distribution of household total expenditure and non labour market
time12. Stochastic dominance criteria may be a fruitful way of approaching
welfare measurement deﬁned over these arguments because of the particular
problems involved in determining the price of non-market time when this may
depend on unobserved cross-sectional productivity diﬀerences, or the incidence
of cyclical or sector-speciﬁc involuntary unemployment.
Goodman, Johnson and Webb (1997) have shown that inequality in real
equivalised total household expenditure grew over the 1980’s and levelled of in
the early 1990’s. This increase in inequality was less marked than the increase in
income inequality over the same period. They also show that whilst real incomes
amongst the poorest tenth of the population were ﬂat over the period, real
expenditure amongst this group grew. Gregg and Wadsworth (1996) show that,
over roughly the same period, whilst employment in general moved cyclically,
12Ibbott (1998) looks at ﬁrst order dominance criteria for this joint distribution amongst
Canadian households.
15the number of households with zero hours work rose steeply in the early 1980’s
but the employment growth (in large part an increase in part-time work) which
occurred subsequently was largely conﬁned to households which already had
positive hours of work. This resulted, by the end of the period, in a situation
in which there were many more multi-worker households and roughly twice as
many households with no workers.
In this section each households’ contribution to social welfare is deﬁned to
be a time separable and increasing function of equivalised current real expendi-












)o ft h e
hth household, where ψ
h
x ≥ 0 and ψ
h
−t ≥ 0 or equivalently ψ
h
t ≤ 0. The as-
sumption of time separability means that a comparison of social welfare between
periods depends only upon diﬀerence in the within-period distributions. The ar-
guments of social welfare are chosen to be observable analogues of consumption
and leisure although both are far from perfect proxies. If ﬁrst order dominance
can be established then there is no need to specify the signs of second derivatives
and cross partials. If ﬁrst order dominance cannot be established, then the tests
of second order dominance will concentrate on functions drawn from Ψ−− and
Ψ++ (i.e. concave functions). If second order dominance cannot be established
further restrictions are placed on the set of admissible functions and third order
dominance is examined.
5.1 Data
The data are from the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) for the years 1975,
1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995. The FES is an annual random cross section survey
13Note that this includes any expenditures related to the ﬁxed and variable costs of being
in work which (all other things being equal) may not be welfare increasing.
14Household expenditures are normalised by the McClement’s equivalence scale and deﬂated
by a common Törnqvist price index with weights taken from the all items Retail Prices Index
(1997=1). Hours of work have not been normalised on the basis that the marginal (dis)utility
of an hour’s work is not aﬀected by typical normalisation schemes where leisure is measured
by the household’s total time endowment less the number of hours worked.
16of around 7,000 households (this represents a response rate of around 70% for
most of the period). The FES records data on household structure, employment,
income and the spending over the course of a two week diary period. In the FES
the information is aggregated to the household level and averaged across the two
week period to give weekly expenditure ﬁgures for over 300 diﬀerent goods and
services. In what follows the data on total expenditure is deﬁned in the FES
as total (weekly) household expenditure plus the imputed value of free school
m i l ka n ds c h o o lm e a l s .T h i si st h e nd e ﬂated to 1999 values and equivalised as
described above. Hours of work are total usual weekly hours excluding breaks
and overtime for the household.
Figures 1, 2 and 3 illustrate b p,a n db F for 1975, 1985 and 1995 15.T h e s e
ﬁgures use all of the available data from each year. All the years indicate mass
points in the non-market time distribution at 0, -40 and -80 hours roughly
corresponding to zero hours work and to full-time work for one and two adults
in a household. However these mass points grow less pronounced over time with
increased frequency of observations elsewhere indicating the growth in part-time
work. In the real (equivalised) expenditure dimension there is evidence of an
increased number of observations in the upper tail over time.
5.2 Results
This section reports the results of tests of dominance in the joint distribution
of real equivalised total household expenditure, and non labour market time for
all for the years considered. The joint distribution is partitioned into 10×10
cells with the partitions in each dimension placed at the nine decile points. The
tests reported below are at 95% for both univariate and bivariate distributions
(the critical values from the SMM distribution are 2.8 for the univariate results
and 3.47 for the bivariate results16). The aim is to contrast the diﬀerent wel-
fare implications drawn when considering each of the univariate distributions in
isolation, with the those which focus on the joint distribution.
15Similar ﬁgures for the other years studied are available (grudgingly) from the author.
16Stoline and Ury (1979).
175.2.1 Full sample results
Table 3 gives descriptive statistics for the covariates for the entire sample. Mean
real expenditure grew year-on-year over the period, as did inequality in real
spending as measured by its variance also grew up until 1990. However, between
1990 and 1995 the variance of real expenditure fell. Mean non labour market
time increased every year and its variance fell.
The ﬁrst two blocks of table 4 reports the results of the dominance tests
in each of the univariate distributions. The entries indicate the dominance
hypothesis which rejects the relevant null for the row-year over the column-year.
For example h1 in the row for 1980 and the column for 1975 in the ﬁrst block
indicates that the null of common distributions is rejected in favour of dominance
of 1980 over 1975 for all ψ
¡
e xh¢
in Ψ. In the case of non labour market time
later years always ﬁrst order dominate earlier ones, perhaps unsurprisingly given
data on increase means and reduced variances over the period. The univariate
results for real expenditure follow a roughly similar pattern with ﬁrst order
dominance established for 1980 over 1975, for 1990 over 1985 and for 1995 over
all years except for 1980.
The bivariate results for these data are reported in the third block in table
4 and are similar to those in the univariate table. Indeed they should be as
rejection of univariate dominance in the marginal distributions would also reject
dominance in the joint distribution. First order dominance is established for
1990 over 1985 and for 1995 over all years except for 1980. However, 1980,
which ﬁrst order dominated 1975 with respect to both marginal distributions
only ﬁrst order dominates 1975 for functions within the class Ψ+ (positive cross
partials). Second order dominance, however, is established for Ψ− and hence
for Ψ++ ∪ Ψ−−.
185.2.2 Date-of-birth cohort results
In the section the data are split by date-of-birth cohort17.T h eﬁrst set of results
are for the pre 1930 cohort. The youngest of these households would have been
46 in 1975 and 76 by 1995. The number of observations in this cohort drops
from 3,539 in 1975 to 1,456 in 1995 partly through mortality and partly because
of higher non-response rates in the FES for older households and because people
in retirement homes are not surveyed. The mean age in the cohort will therefore
be dropping over time.
Table 5 reports descriptive statistics and shows increase real spending up
until 1990 followed by a drop, possibly related to retirement in this cohort.
Real expenditure inequality measured by its variance falls between 1975 and
1980 but rises afterwards until 1990. In the 1995 the variance of spending drops.
Non market time in this cohort increases every year with mean hours of work
reaching very low levels by 1995. Its variance falls year-on-year. The dominance
results are summarised in table 6. The univariate results indicate that earlier
years tend to ﬁrst order dominate later ones in the expenditure distribution,
with the reverse being true for the non market time distribution. In other
words considering each argument on it’s own would give strongly contrasting
pictures of the changes in social welfare. The exception in the case of spending
is the year 1995 which second order dominates 1990 and third order dominates
1985. Given that the univariate results run (for the most part) in opposite
directions the lack of bivariate dominance results is not surprising. There is
little indication of increased welfare for this cohort; second order dominance,
however, is establish for 1995 over 1990, and for 1980 over 1975.
Table 7 report the descriptive statistics for households with a mean date-
of-birth between 1929 and 1940. Mean real spending grows over the period
whilst it variance also grows but not year-on-year: the variance is lower in 1980
than 1975 for example and in 1995 compared to 1990. Non labour market time
increases over the period and the variance drops. The univariate dominance
17The split is based upon mean date of birth for all adults in the household.
19results reported in table 8 for non labour market time are clear cut with ﬁrst
order dominance established for every year over preceding ones. There is less
of a patterns in the real expenditure (marginal) distribution. The bivariate
results in the third block in table 8 follow the univariate ones in this case with
ﬁrst order dominance established for the three comparisons for which ﬁrst order
dominance in both the univariate distributions is established.
The next date-of-birth cohort is made up of households with mean date-
of-birth between 1939 and 1950. Descriptive statistics for this sub-sample are
reported in table 9. This shows increase mean real expenditure for this cohort
year-on-year throughout the period and increase inequality with the now typical
exception of 1995 in which the variance of real spending fell compared to 1990.
Mean non labour market time falls to begin with but then increases and its
variance follows a similar pattern. The univariate results in table 10 show a
broadly similar pattern for both real spending and non market time, with later
years generally dominating. An exception is 1995 in the spending distribution.
Interestingly in the real spending distribution 1990 second order dominates 1995,
whilst 1995 dominate 1990 in the non market time distribution. Despite this ﬁrst
order dominance is established for 1995 over 1990 in the bivariate distribution.
In general, later years ﬁrst order dominate in the joint distribution up until
1990 with more mixed results for 1995. 1980 only second order dominates 1975
however. Note that the fact that 1995 ﬁrst order dominates 1990, and 1990
ﬁrst order dominates all 1980 and 1985 implies that if social preferences are
transitive then 1995 dominates these years as well. This provides reasonable
evidence of increased welfare for this group.
The ﬁnal set of results are for cohorts born after 1949 (tables 11, and 12).
Mean real spending increases throughout the period and there is also an in-
crease in non market time. The variance for both covariates generally increase
although not year-on-year. The univariate results are mixed. In the real spend-
ing distribution all years ﬁrst or second order dominate 1985, however in the
non market time distribution 1985 dominates every other except for 1995. The
20bivariate results reﬂect this mixed picture with only second order dominance
established for four comparisons out of ten (and only for functions drawn from
Ψ++ for dominance of 1975 over 1980). Again transitivity of social preferences
implies that 1995 second order dominates 1990 and the 1975 second order dom-
inates 1985. This give weak evidence of decreasing welfare for this cohort in the
earlier years and increasing welfare between 1990 and 1995.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper has extended the test procedures in Anderson (1996) to multivariate
distributions. These tests were applied to UK data on real equivalised household
spending and non labour market time. It was shown that it was possible to
establish dominance of various orders using these techniques. It is also shown
that considering each of the covariates in isolation may sometimes give strongly
contrasting evidence on the changes in social welfare over time and that it may
therefore be important to adopt the multivariate approach. Further, it was
shown that even when the null of no dominance could not be rejected in one
or other marginal distribution, dominance of various order could be established
with respect to the joint distribution. The empirical results indicate that for
the population overall, social welfare increased towards the end of the period
with 1995 ﬁrst order dominating 1975, 1985 and 1990 indicating unanimous
ranking by all functions increasing in these argument. There is also evidence of
increased social welfare between 1975 and 1980 for concave functions. Results
by date-of-birth cohort indicate that most of the increases in welfare were felt
by the 1939 to 1950 cohort. The youngest cohort (born in 1950 and after) show
some indications of reduced welfare (for concave utility functions) in the earlier
years but a gain in 1995 over 1985.
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26Table 1: Bivariate dominance criteria, null and alternative hypotheses.
Null Alternative Class of Ψ
1st Order dominance
H0 : ∆Fi (.),∆F (.)=0 H1F : ∆Fi (.),∆F (.) ≤ 0 Ψ−
H0 : ∆Fi (.),∆K (.)=0 H1K : ∆Fi (.),∆K (.) ≤ 0 Ψ+
H0 : ∆Fi (.),∆F (.),∆K (.)=0 H1 : H1F and H1K Ψ− ∪ Ψ+
2nd Order dominance
H0 : ∆Hi (.),∆H (.)=0 H2H : ∆Hi (.),∆H (.) ≤ 0 Ψ−−
H0 : ∆Hi (.),∆L(.)=0 H2L : ∆Hi (.),∆L(.) ≤ 0 Ψ++
H0 : ∆Hi (.),∆H (.),∆L(.)=0 H2 : H2H and H2L Ψ−− ∪ Ψ++
3rd Order dominance
H0 : ∆Ji (.),∆J (.)=0 H3J : ∆Ji (.),∆J (.) ≤ 0 Ψ−−−
H0 : ∆Ji (.),∆M (.)=0 H3J : ∆Ji (.),∆M (.) ≤ 0 Ψ+++
H0 : ∆Ji (.),∆J (.)=0 ,∆M (.)=0 H3 : H3J and H3M Ψ−−− ∪ Ψ+++
27Table 2: Univariate dominance criteria, null and alternative hypotheses.
Null Alternative Class of Ψ
1st Order dominance
h0 : ∆Fi (.)=0 h1 : ∆Fi (.) ≤ 0 Ψ
2nd Order dominance
h0 : ∆Hi (.) h2 : ∆Hi (.) ≤ 0 Ψ−
3rd Order dominance
h0 : ∆Ji (.) h3 : ∆Ji (.) ≤ 0 Ψ−−
28Table 3: Descriptive statistics, all households.
e xh −th
Mean Std.Dev Min Max Mean Std.Dev Min Max n
75 197.22 128.15 29.25 3365.54 -45.12 38.25 -270 0 7203
80 207.05 129.00 21.10 2793.25 -41.43 37.06 -240 0 6944
85 220.36 155.49 10.67 2912.98 -35.62 36.22 -276 0 7012
90 246.47 198.88 20.12 5287.11 -34.38 34.95 -218 0 7046
95 261.24 183.75 26.78 3514.31 -31.79 34.01 -244 0 6759










75 80 85 90 95 75 80 85 90 95 75 80 85 90 95
75
80 h1 h1 H1(K)H2(H)
85 h1 h1
90 h1 h1 h1 h1 H1
95 h1 h1 h1 h1 h1 h1 h1 H1 H1 H1
30Table 5: Descriptive statistics, households with mean adult d.o.b pre 1930.
e xh −th
Mean Std.Dev Min Max Mean Std.Dev Min Max n
75 180.60 135.98 29.25 3365.54 -27.44 32.35 -164 0 3539
80 182.66 132.84 21.10 2793.25 -18.79 26.29 -168 0 2892
85 184.75 146.76 34.61 2912.98 -8.84 18.50 -115 0 2487
90 189.74 172.66 20.12 2036.30 -3.92 12.32 -112 0 2057
95 180.66 155.12 26.78 3514.31 -1.32 6.55 -83 0 1456










75 80 85 90 95 75 80 85 90 95 75 80 85 90 95
75 h1 h1 h1 h1
80 h1 h1 h1 h1 H2
85 h1 h1 h1
90 h1 h1 h1
95 h3 h2 h1 h1 h1 h1 H2
32Table 7: Descriptive statistics, households with mean adult d.o.b 1930 to 1939.
e xh −th
Mean Std.Dev Min Max Mean Std.Dev Min Max n
75 219.18 126.78 54.25 2483.55 -68.73 35.90 -204 0 1516
80 229.02 123.53 55.52 1323.36 -60.24 32.25 -164 0 1016
85 249.86 163.20 33.58 1963.46 -44.39 29.71 -152 0 849
90 262.64 202.94 48.76 2060.69 -33.51 27.42 -136 0 836
95 266.12 195.60 46.81 1952.59 -16.12 22.80 -110 0 880










75 80 85 90 95 75 80 85 90 95 75 80 85 90 95
75
80 h1 h1 H1
85 h1 h1
90 h1 h1 h1 h1 H1
95 h1 h1 h1 h1 h1 H1
34Table 9: Descriptive statistics, households with mean adult d.o.b 1940 to 1949.
e xh −th
Mean Std.Dev Min Max Mean Std.Dev Min Max n
75 208.02 113.20 57.50 1625.56 -57.94 35.94 -270 0 1631
80 223.94 124.21 29.17 1531.69 -61.13 38.30 -236 0 1856
85 246.07 157.79 10.67 2096.67 -56.19 35.73 -207 0 1572
90 287.27 201.06 40.09 2866.13 -52.16 32.77 -162 0 1169
95 293.84 189.29 32.69 1808.40 -36.48 30.78 -138 0 903










75 80 85 90 95 75 80 85 90 95 75 80 85 90 95
75 h1
80 h1 H2
85 h1 h1 h1 h1 H1 H1
90 h1 h1 h1 h2 h1 h1 H1 H1 H1
95 h1 h1 h1 h1 h1 H1 H1
36Table 11: Descriptive statistics, households with mean adult d.o.b. 1950 and
after.
e xh −th
Mean Std.Dev Min Max Mean Std.Dev Min Max n
75 212.96 104.15 70.00 838.52 -56.58 30.77 -197 0 515
80 221.36 121.62 39.81 1352.86 -49.72 30.80 -240 0 1180
85 231.47 152.78 37.84 2909.97 -48.41 36.06 -276 0 2102
90 265.19 205.47 21.67 5287.11 -48.66 34.38 -218 0 2982
95 285.17 180.60 28.43 1923.85 -47.15 33.82 -244 0 3517










75 80 85 90 95 75 80 85 90 95 75 80 85 90 95
75 h2 h2 H2(L)
80 h2 h1 H2
85 h1 h1 h1
90 h1 h1 H2
95 h1 h1 h1 h1 H2
38